here on display. you have a display here at the consumer electronics show on capitol hill. >> essentially ford is a technology company. i mean, these days companies really have to innovate and bring technology into their overall plan in order to stay up with the consumer demand. we're spending more consumer technology in their lives, cars. ford is looking to do that in the safeway. looking for information and updates and information.

we want to make sure it's unsafely. what we are demonstrating here today is health and wellness and the car working with third-party industry leaders, companies in the medical device field and management to develop systems where people can access. >> so what are you specifically displaying or talking to lawmakers about? >> have you things. we have here a phone work app currently available on your iphone. ford is working with the maker of this at to provide a way to have this information read out to you, again handsfree, through a scene to enable ford vehicle you're in the car. let's say you're driving through an area that has high travel account. this will tell you on the allocation based service that

you might want to avoid this area. drive around it. >> the policy part of this. >> yes. hands freak, again, ford is very focused on. put your hands on the wheel, keep your eyes focused on driving. so, again, if you know that people are going to want access to information which you see in a lot of growing trend. if they're able to do that safety while driving. there is another safety aspect as well. people with diabetes where, you know, they have symptoms that might interfere with their driving. we are also working with a medical device company. again, tell you when you might

want to pull over. blurry vision. having an effect on your driving. >> thank you for your time. [background noises] >> coming up tonight on it c-span2, the middle east policy center hosts discussion on the threat of chemical weapons in the syrian conflict. later, a former u.s. latin america relations as the reason grows. then, the chief of the u.s. forest service talks about efforts to control wild fires. on tomorrow washington journal, the top star crap on the budget committee. to talk about campaign finance disclosure legislation and the tax increases in spending cuts scheduled to take effect next

year. we are joined by congressman ron paul for a conversation about his plans for the republican national convention and in expected house vote this week on his legislation requiring an audit of the federal reserve. also, the co-chairman of the state budget crisis taskforce on structural problems facing state budgets. washington journal is live every day at 7:00 a.m. eastern. wednesday on washington journal, a spotlight on magazines focus is on generational warfare. nonetheless become editor and chief of reason tv will discuss his article on the gap between older and younger americans when it comes to entitlements. that is live wednesday at 19:00 a.m. eastern on c-span. ♪ >> watched book tv and american

history tv the weekend of august 4th and 5th had to c-span local content vehicles to explore the heritage and literary culture of louisville, kentucky, hall of churchill downs, louisville slugger, and the oldest independent bookstore, carmichael's. >> love of the stores that i have seen failed are stores that were opened by people who work interested in having a business, not that they were have an attachment to books or, you know, -- they were business people. i think you really have to have kind of get attachments to bucks to care enough. they come because they really care about bucks. >> monday the syrian foreign ministers of the country will be willing to use as chemical weapons in case of foreign attack. in washington impanel a middle

east experts discussed the latest developments and their role of the international community in the conflict that has reportedly killed more than 17,000 syrians. of this event was hosted by the middle east policy council. >> good morning, everyone. thank you very much for the mideast council for organizing this of and. i will focus on three points. first, the state of the regime or what is left from the regime from the assad regime and the syrian army. the second points about the original indication of the conflict in syria and the u.s. action which everyone connected. now, it has been 18 months since

the syrian uprising started in march of last year. the assad regime's systematic killings and widespread killings . and now, of course, more and more use of force. yesterday, as an example, for the first time using their rockets. and in damascus. for the first time ever in assyrian history which goes back 10,000 years we see one of the leaders or the president of the country killing his -- showing his own capital. this is, of course, very alarming for the population in damascus, and no one expects that to happen. the number of -- the people who have been killed, the civilians exceeds now 18,000, included

1,800 children under 18 years old and, of course, when -- if we talk chelate that means 7 percent of those killed the children. in normal wars that persons according to the red cross, three to 5%. this is up to normal. this gives you a sense of how much those children have been systematically targeted by the assad regime. of course, the number of the people who have been detained exceed 30,000. we believe the number is much higher according to the last report, maybe more than 27 secret missions on military bases. and, of course, the number of people, the number exceeding day-by-day, especially of that in damascus. according to the un, and

1 million have been displaced inside the country, and more than half a million in lebanon or jordan, turkey, and iraq. the assad regime, of course, the balls exploded in damascus with started in what is called a crisis management group. since the uprising started, the assad regime has found what is called the crisis management group under the lead of the national security office. this is under the of the baath party. mainly you is included, is the head of all the security branches along with the ministry of defense, ministry of interior the deputy minister of defense, which his brother-in-law. those, basically those ten or 12

people who are making decisions day-by-day, who are giving the orders to the military groups or the military groups. all of the security to go to attack on all the illustrations, all the areas and give orders to the same people. it was a big explosion within the security, of course, which left five of those leaders killed, especially the ministry of defense, ministry of interior the head of the crisis management group and the chief or the president of the national security office. after that we expected the assad regime would accept to do some compromise because, at least, he lost his brother in law.

he is basically the number one guy in syria since the uprising started. he was responsible on all of the shelling and the killings, destruction in that area. the other scenario which was more likely, the assad regime will go among become more aggressive against his own people. and this is what has happened. now, the regime gives the orders for the air force to attack the areas in different ways. but this shows the strength of the army. now, they control most of the border area with turkey and iraq, still tense, but all other border points with turkey and iraq in the hand of the free syrian army.

and basically, the free syrian army controls, according to their head of the un mission, more than 40 territories in syria which, of course, now, it has become increased because much of the value will suburban the hand of the three syrian army and, of course, in the northern part of syria and many areas, many areas in damascus. what is happening exactly, the free syrian army -- free syrian army relies mainly on the arms within the assad army because the assad army, when he decided to involve the army in the military operations, most of the

army soldiers and officers of our sunni. and there are some alawite sect officers. what we have which makes the situation much worse that we don't have like what has happened in yemen, there is defection in the army. what happens coming from, especially from the middle ranking, the middle ranking. this is why the free syrian army getting much bigger with the same time there is no safety zone or there is no area or liberated area. can't organize itself, can do the operations in much more organized way or in strategy. what she has done in all the ways that going back and forth in many areas, that has caused

many civilian switch will cost many people to be killed by the free syrian army. mainly the three syrian army, as i said, officers who defected. we have now three major general sued defected. three of them and turkey. and we have, of course, two weeks ago i just visited the officers in turkey. we have more than 1,000 -- 192 colonels who defected based in turkey. most effective, of course, the middle rankings, officers did deflected and stay inside the country, especially in the area of the moscow suburb. what -- the state of the opposition. exactly the state of the

opposition connected to the role of the engine national community. last week the security council, again, fail to adopt any resolution and a charter seven to protect the civilians. even if the resolution had been passed in syria, all of the discussion, the situation in syria because what we had, it's almost our conflict. the security council, the officials here, the state department, they talk about, we don't need more militarization of the situation which already we have armed conflict. six months ago. the situation became much more -- there is no -- any kind of peaceful demonstrations allowed

by the -- regime. the assad regime dealt with the peaceful demonstrations along with the same way in the last months, two incidents where there have been changes on a peaceful demonstrations which left more than 60 people killed. this is why we don't advise the people to go to peacefully. in this area and not protected by the free syrian army. the implication of the schelling's, it's very high for the civilians. this is why the international community failed to adopt any resolution or to take any action to protect the civilians. that has undermined, let's say, the a position, and the mind mainly as syrian national council. the role of the syrian national

council of the opposition to mobilize ingests a community to protect the civilians became the main demand of the syrian underground. this is why it became the syrian national council much more weaker and helpless in the eyes of the syrians and the leaders of the free syrian army who are defending the syrian people on the ground became the healers of the syrian people in the hearts and minds of the syrians. the same situation likely to be happen because of up in 1999 when the entire some community failed to adopt a new resolution to protect the civilians. a week on the ground right now because much of the areas being liberated by the free syrian army, there is no control. as example for any political opposition there. there is no political authority for the essence of the syrian national council on that area. this is, unfortunately, because

the lack of actions or inactions by the ins a national community. and the security council, we much expected that from our visit to moscow and from the comments of officials. we say that many times we don't need to try and lift hard time more and more with the security council. we come to the way we are actually, the actions beyond the security council is much more important. we see many times that the moral authority tap save the children and civilians is above the legal authority that the security council gives. we come up to the situation, many cases have been the history with the security council was unable to adopt a new resolution this is why we have. should they have very different agendas to take any actions to protect the civilians.

of course now we have -- we see more and more strings to the three syrian army in more areas liberated. i don't think they expected that the free syrian army would be able to liberate damascus. made the situation getting much, cheaper and more civilians would be killed. because the free syrian army has no weapons or any. this is now for the free syrian army. more important right now for the u.s. to take the historical decision, take actions p.m. the security council to mobilize the committee within the confines to implement the safety zone along with the turkish border and jordan much more expected. enthusiastic. to implement the safety zone

also was between the jordanian and the syrian border. the safety zone is a priority right now, especially for the civilians. fort a humanistic -- humanitarian assistance, the cities and the people who are in need. even that we have a defective safety zone. the number block of syria, still attacked by the air force. this is why it is an important to have a no-fly zone on of the disney area to protect the civilians. finally, many questions about the chemical weapons. there is no much more permission exactly. today this book, and enough of the military. the regime will not use any given the -- chemical weapon if only they had been attacked by outsiders. i don't believe in that because

the assad regime used many kinds of weapons never used before. especially in the area of iraq stand. this is why we have to be careful, and we have to really for any, any, any expectation by the -- regime. finally, i think the united states has failed to deal with of assyrian crisis from the beginning. they should -- the united states should expect that the syrian crisis will take. because the type of -- its main elite, well, the fundamental of assad, a type of guy which can do whatever, can do just to stay in power. this is why i think the united states should be prepared to

come by itself, for the situation to come to this stage. in mobilizing the international community, walking with the security council which, of course, being beaten by russia and china which became a failed policy to try again with the security council because there is no indication or sign for the change of the russian policy. at the same time the united states, there is no indication for the united states and it decided to take any action beyond the security council were within reference to the syrian people. i think is important right now for the united states to take actions beyond the security council. finally, the transition in syria i don't see any indications for

and managed transition in syria unfortunately because the northern part of syria, which mainly, concentrated there. those -- groups or military groups that now control different areas. the free syrian army or differing groups within the free syrian army control many areas in northern polar syria, and there is no political authority. this is, of course, as i said before, this is consequences for the inactions from the international community. now of syria has become much more difficult to deal with because the energy of syria, of course, will be -- there is no question between the syrians about that. again and again, how to have central government and the end because many from other regime is losing control, and that is

lifting a vacuum within the whole country. there is no political authority in the opposition right now to come and control in many areas that have been liberated and the northern part of syria. this is why i think it is important now for the opposition to work along with the arab league. they call again another try for bashar al-assad to step aside in his safe exit. but, again, this shows how the arab league alone with the international community without any muscles, without any teeth, which is giving the green light for the bashar al-assad to continue the killing and selling different areas. more important to concentrate right now on the syrian conflict and put all our efforts and all

are efforts toward their to make any action because this is the only way to make the transition in syria in much successful way. thank you very much. [applause] >> i want to thank the council for inviting me. when they asked me, i think it was a month ago, to attend this meeting and to participate in discussion, i suggested that the time, whenever we were thinking about the issue then is probably going to be overrun by the time

that we meet today. i also would remind that when i published the book, the gulf war in 1991. actually sent it to the printer. the last moments change all the references to the u.s.s. r at the last moment and placed it with the russian federation. i think we're living in a time when so many changes are taking place. many assumptions have to be revisited. some people compare what is happening in syria today, i mean, the middle east in general comes with the political upheaval to what is happening in eastern europe for 1991. i am a little bit skeptical, but i do enjoy a stoical analogy, and i am very much into irony,

so this week. so a few days ago when a friend of mine here is actually very much more active with the u.s. role in syria, suddenly and e-mail about the issue. i responded by recalling the not so long time ago we were also being assets to do a regime change and that was an air rock very much like in syria now. the u.s. was asked to alice. the military dictatorship controlled by the secular fascist of that party and also a member of the family, bashar al-assad in syria. but the muslim sunni. now muslim alawite sect in

syria. the opposition leaders very much like the opposition leaders in syria now placed to confirm the country into a sanctioned liberal democracy, to adopt a free-market economy, and to turn the country into a strategic ally of the united states. what we heard in the country, which is very much like syria. invention of european imperialism constituting of many tribal religious and ethnic groups making a coherent national identity. but the country that was sliding into a civil war. washington did help to insert the power in baghdad. the secular sunni regime to a corrupt islamists shiite

government. it actually allied today with the the run. election did take place in rock, but women and religious minorities are threatened to for political power. i'm not even going to dwell about the cost to the united states in terms of the military, economic, and the credibility in the middle east and elsewhere. so now we are basically being asked to produce a rerun in syria. now, as i said to my friend to my some send me an e-mail immediately saying, yeah, the opposition in syria, trying to go with my argument. i note that i was not thinking about it. i was thinking about the guy by the name of mckeon, also known as samir, a very educated, very

distant, very intelligent guy. intellectual who was liberal, probably even social democrat who published a book in the 1980's called the republic of phil which dictated what was basically at that time the total trample of barack. it was one of the first to call for u.s. intervention to oust some $. let's just say that if you read the book, the u.s. intervention, one of the characters. not living in baghdad any more. so i think that in the face of the pressure on the obama

administration to do something as soon as possible, a certain skepticism at a minimum is demanded. appropriately. under the best case scenario we would probably replace the sigalert regime in damascus, which is allied with hezbollah with an islamist sunni government that is allied with saudi arabia and turkey. ..

>> would spill over into lebanon and iraq and would invite outside intervention by regional and global power and the middle east. syria will become a focal point for the regional tension between the shiite and sunnis which

could spread to the rest of the middle east. syria could become i think what spain was in the 1930's or lebanon was during the war between the major political powers or secular versus islam and shiite and the patron and other interested players including saudi arabia, iran, israel, russia and china. that would require the a united states to invest more military and economic resources at the time the of the united states less of both. the conflict was only the

limited effect on the u.s. national interest and this is also at a time when the market is trying to refocus its sanctions on the global strategy in east asia and of dealing with the rise of china, which i think is the main geostrategic challenge in the united states today. the u.s. will begin today spend more time and energy in trying to resolve the never ending conflict between the global losers if you will but try to reflect instead of engaging with the economic powerhouses of east asia. let me stress i do think that president obama respond to the crisis and syria and to the so-called arab spring in general

is effective and reminded me of the collective the soviet union and the soviet bloc in the 90's. some critics describe it as muddling through. i think it was basically a very normal ideological empirical type of approach which we tend to call realist. but the administration was giving is pursuing the policy of cutting the close the u.s. in case of the collapse of a long time allies of washington and the growing instability in the middle east. juggling many interests, and taking into consideration the tension between the promotion of

change and maintaining order. i think under this condition, especially may be the will of the power to deploy u.s. troops in syria or other countries in the region has to consider the interest of our lives like saudi arabia as well as the interest of the global competitors like russia and china really makes sense to provide some help to the position in the countries. rather, this continuing to resist the pressure for the direct military intervention. but the crisis in syria also demonstrates why the kind of

american thinking that has been popular in recent months that what is going now in the middle east is the manifestation of an on stoppable drive to freedom and democracy like in eastern europe in 1992. like the thinking should at least be challenged and be questioned. they examine what is really happening in syria and in the middle east in general as opposed to wishful thinking on the part of all kind of global space crusaders on the left and on the right. i think what we are facing now is the closing seconds of the american unai polar moment in the middle east coupled with many challenges to the old political order in the region which is producing a major shift in the balance of power.

we have the sunni shiite possibility of disintegration and the state's and we are deprived of iran and turkey and perhaps even egypt and the major regional powers and one of the returns of russia and the arrival of china. all of the changes make it very difficult for the united states to affect the changes that are taking place in the region and explains why going back to the title of the discussion by the u.s. has many options available in syria today. thank you. [applause]

[inaudible] >> talking about a pragmatic response to the obama administration, which has orchestrated sanctions and try to determine the media opposition who ought to get weapons and who should not get weapons. >> thank you, tom for inviting me to this interesting panel. i also want to express my congratulations to the middle east policy council on its journal running for 30 years and it's a terrific editor. of course she's published 11 of my articles i am not to buy used at all but it is a fine journal if you haven't picked it up i

recommend that you do. i want to talk about russia and syria that obviously russia has been blocking the u.n. security council action on syria. russian has expressed support for the al asad regime. obviously china has done these things, too but in the sense that russia seems to be following and is taking the lead on this life was in moscow at the very end of june and was able to talk to various russian experts on this as well as the journalists. i hope to share some of those. but the real question is why are the russians backing us not so strongly? why of the russians the game? their of the nefarious reasons cited for this. people have mentioned the

russian arms relationship with syria that might lose. russian investments in the syrian petroleum sector. there are the naval facilities that russia has, the only russian naval societies are the former soviet union, and i think that these are important reasons for moscow to support the fear of losing all these but if none of these things existed, if there was no russian base, no russian arms sales to syria, no russian oil companies i think that russia would still support the assault regime coming and talking to the russians about the question now when you ask them why are they supporting the al asad regime that the argument tends to be in terms of the

united states thus far as the russians are concerned, america went into afghanistan and messed that up. brent into iraq and messed that up, too. went to libya and as far as they are concerned we messed that up also so now we want to do something about syria they think they know the old, is going to be. it's going to be messed up as well in that america can always go home come back beyond its neighborhoods where russia lives. and when these places get messed up to get messed up for russia in particular in that the u.s. doesn't seem to -- either the u.s. is ignorant of this war in the conspiracy thinking that is, and unfortunately in the shuttle's well as other places are the americans doing this deliberately. i think messing things up in order to herd russia, and there have been various russian

leaders who have made suggestions that this is in fact what the american motives actually is. now, we don't have to accept that very much but all i can say is the sort of thinking that we do feel was there and said just where they might begin. another thing and that bothers the russians is libya in particular there seems to be a genuine sense almost every russian night spoke to feels that the u.s. to get advantage of russia last year and libya that russia as well as china allows a no-fly resolution to pass in the security council with regard to libya and what did america and the west and their allies do? but instead of simply managing the no-fly zone, free actively

assisted the opposition against gadhafi the we went beyond the terms of the resolution that russia and china had to prove with that trick again even though the resolution is for syria that has been vetoed have to deal with economic sanctions far left in the no-fly zone they see any resolution as a thin edge of the wedge for american intervention which they are not going to approve. they dislike what they feel was western intervention in libya. not just that, but the fact that it somehow got a russian and premature to the security council resolution that they are not going to fall for that trekked again. so these are things that have

motivated them. but also some other reasons. they have to deal with some fairly deep seated use of foreign policy and international relations and first and foremost the russians for america and the west have miscalculated to syria with the effect of the fall of the al asad regime is great to give rise to the democracy the west is mistaken about what is going to happen is the rise of a hostile sunni islamist regime and the west is naive and the russians are not my leave beano with a screen to happen but they don't really know what is going to happen. if you are getting the book that cannot in english not long ago

he i think makes this argument that the whole moscow's support for the nationalist regime he argues from the beginning is misunderstood by america that the russians understood in this kind of regime open this radicalism down and that no matter how bad the regime might be and what is going to come afterwards. what this reflects about the prospect for democracy in the middle east of course they don't see it as being a prospect for russia either and they don't believe that democracy takes place in the united states

either. that is all sort of cartels and couples that with the americans can do is they can help create a popular demand for space change to bring down a government that will be followed by something else altogether. so we are seeing is some other words eight reflection of the deep-seeded russian has done some -- pessimism about this part of the world and they don't understand why america and the west doesn't see it. but another reason why they are supporting the regime so strongly is something that radwan mentioned to that america and the west haven't really done all that much for the syrian opposition. well, the russians have noticed this as well that they have had some long experience with the

united states as we have with them. they know that when we are serious, we are willing and able to out to be to act outside of the security council and so the fact that the u.s. seems to be focusing on security council for the decision suggests to them that we really don't want to go in. that we were using them as the excuse not to go in and they are happy to play that game because after all it makes them look strong and important in other words that russia single-handedly is blocking the united states. this is how they want to be seen at the moment. so they don't see this as something that the u.s. really necessarily wants to get involved in. you might say this is a little contradictory to what i previously said that the americans don't understand, the

americans mess things up, the americans don't really want to get involved as well and all i can say is contradictions are sort of of bound not just in our foreign policy making but in tears as well. another reason though why they support the regime is as i think referred to, they see the syrian opposition as being supported by saudi arabia. now, the russians have long had a contentious relationship with saudi arabia. during the cold war they didn't have diplomatic relations at all. but they were enemies in other words during the heyday and the soviets were supporting. it was the saudis that were supporting the opponent's. north yemen in the 1960's, sort

of the soviets and the egyptians on one side fighting the proxy war with the saudis on the other, which by the way sort of ultimately they came out on top. similarly, with regards to the soviet invasion and occupation of afghanistan for many russians it wasn't so much the u.s. action that supported the soviet ambition in afghanistan. it is the actions of saudi arabia that in terms of the money sent, the individuals said such as osama bin laden, these are the people that cause trouble and who made afghanistan a field of venture which people still defend. once again that the west would have been better off with the marks of government in afghanistan but what of the taliban who came to power in the 1990's and of course may well come to power once again.

the saudis also the russians have accused them in the 1990's of being the principal backers of the rebels. the saudis denied this and indicated they were getting assistance to the refugees. but of course refugees and the rebels are not mutually exclusive categories. in fact they often become rebels and so in the 90's the relationship between saudi arabia and russia was extraordinarily tense. not something they paid an awful lot of attention to and so the russians seized upon 9/11 to sort of side with the u.s. against the saudis and put him in particular never tired of fighting with 15 of the 19 9/11 bombers came out of saudi arabia but then as they always do russian-american relationship is

turned sour and something remarkable happened in 2003, and that was a saudi russian raw process law. i don't want to go into the details of that. it was something i have to admit that at the time i didn't think was going to happen but it did happen. but it's now falling apart the russians feel that the saudis that were initially opposed to the arab spurring the have hijacked the arab spurring supporting the various places that getting involved in yemen of course halting it in the lorain now what they feel was the saudis' chongging to easily malkoff and i really an ally in syria and install their own. why don't the americans understand this? not saying this vision of saudi behavior is accurate. all i am saying is this is how the russians view it in that they are acting on this.

but i think in addition to these foreign policy concerns there is something else and my visit recently impressed me with this and that is syria has become a domestic issue in russia that there is a general sense that in fact their regime is going to fall but who is better off backing al asad to the bitter end even if he falls than to be seen as nothing to the americans, and making russia look weak and making the russians feel we can to be implicated in what ever - change from russia's point of view ochres and syria. in that putin would rather do the formal. there's the sense that they were written off of syria altogether. they know it is going to fall

but they are much happier being seen to continue to define the united states than to be seen cooperating and looking weak. in this sense if in fact syria had become a domestic issue for russia, we here in washington especially on capitol hill think we know a little something about how the domestic politics can affect foreign policy towards this particular region so it shouldn't be a surprise that the russians are afflicted with this as well. now, the question is what does all this mean? one thing i think is pretty obvious and that is that we've often heard that the obama administration hopes that russia is going to help, iran is going to help with syria.

no, they are not. their plane and not going to. they don't see it in their interest in any sense in the foreign policy interest or in their domestic interest that if things are going to go sour in syria they don't want to be associated with it. they won the u.s. to be essentially own that situation. that is the bad news. the good news if there is such good news is they are not actually going to do anything to oppose us either in syria. in other words, if as suggests the time has come for action outside of the security council we are not going to see the russians coming in to defend the regime. it's definitely not worth fighting for. now there has been a recent story that emerged in the past few weeks about the russian

marines have been sent to the russian naval installation. but in my view this is very similar to what they did during the south yemeni civil war in 1986 and in similar occasions in other words that these people are being deployed mainly to help evacuate russian natural not really to get involved in protecting the regime although the signals on the different side might interpret it that way. but i don't see the russians as going to stop us as well. but i do see is the russians and the chinese acting together. there is the sense that they don't know what the chinese are going to do in that whatever cooperation they have from china is only temporary and there is the sense that if the new government a rises and syria,

the chinese will immediately without hesitation, without embarrassment work to get along with it and it's only russia that has stuck its neck out with regards to al asad that may suffer. so i guess i have tried to convey to you is this if it sounds like the russians are pursuing an emotional foreign policy with regard to syria i think that is what i want to convey to you. when we view what they should see as their rational understand the situation and others is that is just not how they see, and a lot of their actions are simply done to defy the united states out of this tremendous sense of betrayal for all of these past actions which in our view they really shouldn't feel betrayed about that, but they do, so this

is the situation that we have to deal with with regard to russia. thank you. [applause] >> thank you. >> what we also offer my thanks to the middle east policy council for inviting me to participate in what i think is an extraordinarily timely session on syria and the various dimensions of responses that we have heard discussed this morning. i would like to stress that we are meeting this morning following what is really quite an extraordinary week in the

unfolding of the 16 to 18 months of cerium uprising and the events that define the previous week as extraordinary include the bombing of the headquarters of the crisis response team that radwan described on wednesday and it includes a growing number of high-level protections from the regime and a media that there are a small number of very senior generals now present in turkey having crossed the border but the total number as i am the stand is now about 24 which leads us to wonder how many more generals are present inside of syria and able to end. some of these extraordinary events also include the escalation of confrontations on the part of the opposition against the regime. in in june there were 250 clashes between the opposition

and government forces. the highest number ever recorded and i think that we are on the page to increase the scale of confrontation this month in syria. these even some input as well the capture of some of the critical border crossings between syria and turkey and syria and iraq by armed opposition forces even though control over those crossings are severely contested by the regime. and i think these developments have collectively produced what i would argue is the most dramatic shift in the dynamics of the syrian uprising since it began back in march, 2011. and i think that despite damascus over the past few days the level that has radically escalated the crisis that syria conference and created tens of

thousands of new refugees, despite that, it is very hard to avoid the conclusion that the stalemate of the past 16 to 18 months between the opposition and the regime has now been decisively broken, that the armed opposition and syria has succeeded in placing the regime on the defensive for the very first time since the start of the uprising and that the uprising has now created a sense of vulnerability about the regime that is causing a shift in the strategic calculus of key actors. a strategic realignment within syria among both the critical insiders who have been the backbone of the regime. but also among some of the segments in the society.

i think one of the consequences of the shift. its plan to be that we will see an acceleration in the unraveling of the regime what is it turnbuckle tinplate in the trajectory of the uprising. it's important to recognize that as we have reached this point even as we have approached but i think is a critical shift in the dynamics of the surprising that the sadr regime still has significant to the bodies we saw them on display this weekend in the damascus neighborhood. we shouldn't kid ourselves. they are important communities within syria that continue to support the regime, and the regime still has significant international backing as we

heard from mark in particular from russia from iran from hezbollah and others. all of which i think underscore that even as we see this very welcome shift in momentum, on the ground would be a severe mistake to imagine that the end of the regime is close at hand or the bringing down the regime could be accomplished without continued efforts by the armed opposition to sustain its current momentum and without significant international support for the efforts of the armed opposition to sustain the momentum that it has achieved over the past several weeks a month or so. and this gets us to the critical question of what role the u.s. might be able to play during this critical phase in the

uprising. and i want to focus on three major areas in discussing what role the u.s. might play. first, in sustaining the momentum of the past few weeks, and ensuring that the regime is not able to regain its footing, and i think that potential does still exist in some areas of the country. second, helping to avoid some of the worst-case outcome that might result during the final phase of the conflict including a much more dramatic escalation of humanitarian crises across the country the escalation of sectarian violence potentially across the country, the possibility of political fragmentation house some areas of the country shift increasingly out of the orbit of government control and third, helping to create the kind of

conditions for some sort of more stable political transition in syria even though radwan was dubious about this prospect i think we do have an obligation to try to ensure that the syrians that have the principal responsibility for managing the future transition have some level of capacity to address the chaos and the instability that the regime has caused as a result of its response to this mass demand for political and economic change that began back in march, 2011. and what i would like to suggest an offering some starting point and how the u.s. might be able to respond in meeting these challenges coming in here - he will see some overlaps with some of the ideas put forward is if we think about addressing the first two of the challenges, sustain the momentum of the

armed opposition and helping to avoid a serious dissent into the kind of violence that we saw in lebanon war in iraq, i think this is going to require a level of engagement with the armed opposition that goes well beyond the limits of current u.s. policy which despite the changes we've seen on the ground continues to be defiant as providing non-lethal support to nonlethal elements of the opposition and dealing with a third of these challenges helping to create the conditions that might promote a more stable political transition is not only linked to how effectively the u.s. can engage in the other's areas that i've mentioned, but will also require that the u.s. significantly rethinks its approach to how it handles the diplomatic side of its

engagement with the syrian uprising and that the u.s. would push much further and much faster than it has been willing to do thus far to shift the focus of diplomacy outside of the u.n. security council being that other speakers have referenced as well and place much greater weight on other institutional frameworks that exist, including as said the friends of syria group, and i would underscore that at the last friends of syria meeting in paris on july 6th ministers representing over a hundred countries were present so that there is no sense in which the friends of syria group should be seen as somehow deficient in its ability to speak on behalf of the international community. but i would also say that those efforts to reach beyond the u.n. security council should include as dysfunctional as it might be, deeper engagement in the arab

league which has the potential to play a positive role and again as noted, and offer was extended it to the regime providing an escape route for the leadership of the regime. they are not likely to accept that offer but it underscores is the possibility to broaden its own engagement in the syrian crisis in ways that might help mitigate the kind of worst-case transition the i think it would be in all of our interests to avoid which would be to say protracted conflict leading to state collapsed. that is the outcome but we are most concerned to avoid and which should be exploiting every available international instrument to try to do so. it does seem to me that with this round of vetoes that we had in the council last week, we

have finally reached a point of recognizing that the unsc cannot be the only legitimate framework for international diplomacy. and some of these alternatives that are available to us i think need to be exploited much more fully and quickly. now just to sort of move towards the close, let me just say a little more about this idea of broadening our engagement with the armed opposition. and i want to make three quick points here in a fairly summary fashion and hope that if there is interest we can pursue them further when we get to the q&a. first, it seems to me that there's a direct correlation between the negotiated transition on the one hand and the capacity of the armed opposition to sustain its recent momentum and its ability to keep the regime on the defensive and to be able to continue to pose a credible threat to the survival

of the regime on the other hand. second, i think there's also a correlation between the level of command and control that exists within the armed opposition and the likelihood that the armed opposition will avoid engaging in the kind of violence and abuse is that will amplify and even sectarian conflict during the final phases of this uprising. and we have to acknowledge that the syrian opposition has participated in activities that are exacerbating the sectarian conflict in syria and that stronger command and control might help to mitigate those kinds of abuses. i also think that there is a correlation between the level of command and control that exists within the armed opposition, and the likelihood is moved, less

violent, less chaotic transition into the post al asad period once the regime collapses and i think there is a great deal more that the u.s. could do to advance all of these like broadening the range of support that we are prepared to provide to the armed opposition. finally, what i would say is we hope to achieve these ends. i also think the u.s. has to be willing much more than it has thus far to put in place remarks for regulating and managing how various international lectors engage with the armed opposition. we have invested an enormous amount of diplomatic effort and political capital in what i would view as a largely futile diplomacy to try to bring russia on more than one sense or another in a more cooperative approach to resolving the crisis

and syria. however, as far as i am aware, we have done very, very little to try to persuade governments that are providing weapons to the armed opposition like the saudis of the need to create frameworks that would regulate how weapons are being provided to the armed opposition, who is receiving weapons within the armed opposition, and and moving us away from what is currently something of a free-for-all in relations between the various factions of the armed opposition and various uncoordinated frameworks of support for the armed opposition that almost ensure that these groups even as they play an increasingly important role on the ground will themselves be willing to enter into frameworks of command

and control that might ensure that they are subordinate both to some overarching military authority but also perhaps in the more important to some overarching severely enough already. and if there is one thing that seems likely to me to increase the probability that the post al asad period will be dominated by competition and perhaps conflict among the groups the way in which the conditions that exist at the moment through which the armed opposition is being supplied by a number of different countries actively resisting being brought into and under a lot of coordination and regulation of their relationships with groups that they are cultivating as their clients, and i think that is a very dangerous trend and its 1i

think would be very worthwhile for the u.s. to invest a great deal more in trying to manage. and i will leave it at that and suggest that i would hope as we see a shift in u.s. diplomacy toward syria began to develop and there was a piece in "the new york times" on the weekend that indicated that some of these shifts are in fact now beginning to take hold within the state department these are the issues that will receive more priority than they have in the past because my sense is that they are going to be very important in determining what kind of transition emerges in syria and determining how the regime falls and what happens after the regime falls. thank you. [applause]

>> thank you to all the speakers. i'm about to open this up to the floor but before i do, let me ask the question one of the themes running through every presentation was lack of knowledge about who the opposition is. we know it is heterogeneous, fragmented. but, we don't know at this moment really who should be getting weapons and who we should not be supporting. and there's a particular concern by a couple panelists about the radical sunni islamists in syria. so can you clarify for us and

break down major movements of the opposition and talk about how they could facilitate some of the recommendations that steve made? >> i can refer you to the situation in libya. all of this since actually the head of the military council has been linked to al qaeda and all of that is being detained in the u.k.. after that, establishes its own political and one of the losing parties in libya. now the majority in the established new council was liberal, which as far away looks to the statistics in an example

the correlation they got 82,000 votes. and after that it was close to the muslim brotherhood in libya they got 8,000. 70,000 votes between the two and this is in libya where you have the tribal society and at the same time how about syria we have much more educated society and much more of course with the strong role of the business community here. this is why of course after 40 years of dictatorship we don't have the established strong political parties or the position for the advances and this is of course by nature where the dictatorship destroys any civil society, any political and syria.

now the syrians start in the beginning how to organize themselves, how to establish political parties and this is why it is after the situation in libya, and i'm quite sure we have much more liberal government and syria. i can assure you that in the most fair and free e elections in the history in 1954. and at that time, the party wins the 16 seats and the muslim brother when only four seats. this is a 1954. of course there are many changes in the social fabric changed in syria but even then the muslim brothers now just they have their own and turkey and expect it to have only 20 in any parliamentarian election after

the regime. this is why i think the opposition and syria will be very divided. this is why we have more difficult transition because there is no strong political party to petition after that. but how does this issue that we will not have a sunni radical government, and unfortunately that is by the media and some experts will be repeating this accusation day-by-day have no knowledge or information about the syrian society or the opposition. now of course the muslim brothers can claim that they were moderate who believe there should be no space and political in syria. they can get 20% of the parliament and then you have the

strong business community in damascus. as one example when the muslim brotherhood strike in damascus but one of the leaders of the business community who called for that, this is the traditional market and syria, they close their markets and stores and you have the strong business community in damascus and the same time the kurdish area this is the fever for in the islamic radical. at the same time they have their own and dynamics. it is a combination in the north and syria the business community, and of course different groups the moderates, but now when we have of course

the armed opposition taking the lead, of course who is now much more expected to sacrifice themself? we saw that in libya and in different countries and this is why they have now that strong voice in the uprising. but always i see that the revolution is different than the election and we saw that in libya and egypt and other countries when it you have stronger voices that doesn't mean it will reflect in the election after the fall. >> do you want to respond? >> i don't know what happened in

1954 to the influence of the republican party, and he was still. other things happened since 1954, and you know, i tend to reject the narratives that tend to play when it comes to the changes taking place in the middle east. there is one narrative that i reject in 1989 but i also reject the notion that this is like iran. the other alternative is iran. things are going out in the middle and that islamist parties are going to play a major role. we see it even in the little country like to nisha. another thing we should remember not every country in the middle east or the same. every country has its own history it's a demographic, its own culture and so on.

it's not bring to happen in each of your syria for that matter and we have to take into consideration i don't know what is going to happen tomorrow. there is a correlation that came to power now we don't know whether it will survive and for libya we should do a number of the ramifications of what happened in bolivia and what is happening today with the rise of islam is the result of what is happening in libya so we have to take the ball into consideration. i mentioned the analogy and it's appropriate. very similar in terms of the culture and geography and so on, and i do -- i am concerned that this is the result of the fall of the regime we are going to see a civil war there and we are going to see radical forces at some point. we are going to have to take all of that into consideration. i don't know who is going to win that election here or syria, and

we certainly cannot base our strong policy based on that kind of expectation. now, one thing that we have to remember, and i do urge that i call it the decrease in a few well. the minorities in every country those are the most educated and most of them speak to or three languages. the top of the globalization and the middle east. those are the kind of people that can do that. what we are seeing in the middle east today is more and more living. they left iraq and i am very worried as a result of what is coming in syria today many of them are going to leave syria and have left lebanon. so that is increasing much more

-- says of reading a gray area instead of the islamic radicalism our democracy. the medalist people are left to write their own narrative if you will. we cannot impose it on them and our policy on wishful thinking and expectations and promises. again, i mentioned earlier i have some kind expectations in iraq by intelligent people like the speaker today promising great things are going to happen in iraq which don't have been and not only because of the u.s. policy. there are many of the things. so let's be realistic about this issue. >> who is the most important partner in helping to implement your recommendations so that we end up with radwan talking about

the rally's and what leon is talking about. >> thanks very much. i'm going to take the opportunity having the microphone to respond quickly to this ongoing exchange and i will then get to your question. i think we have to be attentive to the possibility for some of the worst case of comes mengin the and i think we also have to be realistic and attaching probabilities to those worst-case outcomes and it does seem to me that the probabilities that those kind of comes will be realized in syria are far, far lower than they are and some of the other countries in the region and putting in egypt where the muslim brotherhood had 80 years in which it was able to sustain the development of its organizational infrastructure and so on. syria and iraq differ significantly demographically. you have seven to 8% kurdish population, ten to 11% allawi

and christian. maybe 5% other minorities. you can see that the sunni muslim community is already much smaller percentage of the population in missiles is divided. it contains large numbers of socially conservative fairly poor rural communities who are likely to be drawn to a form of islamist politics that may not look anything like the kind of extremist versions that imported groups have had a very difficult time securing a foothold so i think we have to be aware of the one hand it is almost inevitable that the parties and actors will have influence in the post al asad syria. i think saying that is a very different thing than suggesting that some of the outcomes that loom very large in this list of potential worst-case scenarios

are inevitably going to result in the event that it collapses and i would further argue that the longer this conflict continues the more likely the deepening extremism becomes and that adds an additional incentive for us u.s. posture that shortens the time horizon of this conflict. with direct respect to the question, i would actually argue that the friends of syria group offers the most effective framework for the organization of some kind of cooperative structure for regulating engagement with the armed opposition in part because the members of the friends of syria have already endorsed a wide ranging strategy of engagement in part because western european members of the group have done so as well without the

differences in emphasis and because we've seen a division of labor emerged within the friends of syria group in which some countries are providing weapons and others are providing logistical and different kinds of support that seems to me to offer a good starting point. we could build on that come expand it, institutionalize it, turn it into an an effective framework that is active on the ground probably through some sort of presence in istanbul but it would argue a mechanism for plinking the civilian leadership of the opposition to the leadership of the armed opposition and for building the kind of downward command-and-control structures that might give us a somewhat better chance without being ivies about the obstacle of regulating the conflict of the armed opposition in ways that would have lots of beneficial side effects if we were able to achieve that goal. >> there are a few questions

from the life stream audience. we are live streamed internationally but i would like to get to the physical audience first. we have a microphone here. so, if you have a question would you come to the microphone, please. ..

>> thank you very much. there is no sectarian role in syria. when we say that what the international costs describe will we have and syria are conflict and civil war, that doesn't mean we have a civil war . until now there is no one incident for the free syrian army or for the armed opposition attacking allied civilian groups, and there is no one single incidents. of course the assad regime is insisting on the civil war because he wants to send a message to the syrian people of the only alternative of the -- regime would be the civil war and the other message to the

international community that intervening, that you are digging the civil war. all of that is done on the sectarian background. but there is no, until now, any single -- and this is -- we always -- this is a war launched by the assad regime against his own people. i think it is -- the gruber, when they have no role in supporting the opposition has no say in the process of all when the notice states repeatedly said the day's are counting. she said that in june last year. now we are in july 2012. she repeated that seven or eight times. that doesn't mean anything for the syrians. this is why when you don't have

any role in supporting the opposition i think that you have no role. this is unfortunate. i'm concerned. put itself in a role in transition and syria were actually syria has a very important location. the u.s. should have with the opposition, but the public opinion in syria, if we compare when the u.s. ambassador and hammer, u.s. ambassador. the comment from when secretary clinton or obama's say blob loss statements. any difference between the statements coming from russia, at least when they say they doing, they supporting the assad regime and supplying the assad regime, but when the u.s. say

something, say to us, nonlethal equipment and they don't ask through the state department. a long process of providing the institution that can perform the grant, until we reach the opposition there, give them the equipment that may be all will go over. this is why i think this is an importance. and steve, he wrote a piece very important amenity -- managing the militarization. this is important. right now i don't think that the u.s. can see anything on this issue because the people, they need anything to defend themselves. they don't care. they don't care who is coming from or who is giving. they need the weapons. now we are calling for anti-aircraft. the u.s. actually should support that because the free syrian

army, if the u.s. or any international entity, they don't want to implement a no-fly zone and the free syrian army, how can -- they talk, anti-aircraft which is unnecessary for the free syrian army. about -- the bormann's of this entity, the formants of this entity based, we see that, we fail to build a strong organization as we would like to be. for many reasons. mainly because the lack of support from the international community. i mean, if you compare that tnc or the libyan transition area council with the international community taking action quickly after the call of the no-fly zone, after their call and with a lack of the support. the main idea of the snc to have one at event of opposition to

mobilize the international community's take action. when they felt that, he failed in the eyes of the syrian. as i said before. that is when the frustration among the syrian people about the performance, mainly of the lack of the support from the inch-community. isn't that -- the assistance. meets today $42 million a month for humanitarian assistance. with the snc, got only $10 million since the creation and last october. we need 42 million in aid assistance, humanitarian assistance, displaced people inside syria or for the assyrian refugees in the other conflict. we get only some money regarding the humanitarian assistance.

last thing about the chance addition, this is now much more talk about the transition. we have a transition and a plan, and that is presented and the syrian conference in istanbul. now we much more in discussion and debate about having transitional government or government and exiled. but we would not establish any government in exile without cutting a support from the international community. we will not get to have government in exile being attacked by the syrian people or by the incessant community without having decline. i think it is important for win now the french minister of foreign affairs along with the arab league, they call for government in exile or transitional government. we are in discussion and debating this idea for a while. now i think the moment has come for a transitional government,

but at least it has -- we have to get assurance about the support that in the government has. the government and only -- it's not to have some people as the ministers. the full function call full support from the international community. thank you. >> what is the source of this plan that most money going for weapons is going to air. [inaudible] >> yes. >> thank-you for taking my question. i have two small ones. one, in today's newspapers i see that israel may have to intervene in syria if that is a

possibility that syria chemical weapons could fall into the hands. so how -- then what would the intervention to solve this? and the second thing is, we are again here trying to choreograph what will happen in syria after the fall of the assad regime. we tried everywhere. and i think that we have to be ready for an islamist. if the radicals overthrow the regime and so my question is, is the reaction of the radicals because they hate americans or because of american policy? as long as there is an american support for his role as a lot less will be opposing america. so, i mean, the connection

between what kind of government is dead and american interest. thank you. >> would like to take that. >> well, your first question i really don't have any idea. i doubt very much that you're going to be willing to events in -- the chemical weapons and so on. if anything, it would be in coordination with the u.s. so i don't think that is a problem. as far as the u.s. policy is concerned, i mean, i think the attitude of the people of the middle east, if you will, it reflects many considerations, clearly the issue of israel been one of them. the one i think they use the a lot of anti-americanism in egypt, for example, was because

of the support for mubarak and other proletarian regimes in the area. i think the u.s. would have supported saudi arabia, for example not withstanding israel, not because of oil interests and so on. it's more complicated than that. i do not want to, if i may, i interject one issue that i don't think was mentioned. all of turkey in this conflict. i think turkey is playing a very important role in what is happening in syria, probably even as important as that of saudi arabia. and apropos russia, i think, one of the concerns with russia in some respects, we talk to returning to history. if we go back to the 19th century to the crimean war, for

example, where you had britain and france supporting turkey these heavy russia. in some respects many of those strategic interests are coming back now, and i think russia is interested in the region, the historical, go back to the prison tinian, you know, one of the things that was promised to turkey, those of you forget. before the end of world war ii, russia would continue fighting. so if russia would continue fighting after the revolution, give russia constantinople. that was one of the promises that was made at that time. russia has clearly a lot of interest in the region, and i think one of the main concerns is not so much saudi arabia, but turkey, the role that turkey is blank. >> also, just quickly on the issue of chemical weapons, i don't think there's any question that the security of syria is

very large spread by chemical and biological weapons. perhaps the leading priority of a number of governments, including the u.s. and that there has been an extensive process of contingency planning that has happened to try to end anticipate some areas in which the security of those weapons might be compromised and how various governments would respond to those kinds of conditions, those kinds of circumstances. and it does seem to me that this possibility, again, that chemical weapons might be moved across the border into lebanon is a very low probability event. i do not regard it as among the most likely of the potential scenarios by any means, but i do think that if a number of governments, perhaps even

including hours or to save a significant threat to the security of the stockpiles that some of the contingency plans that have been developed would probably be put into effect. this is an enormous stockpile of weapons. we have to be aware of that. it's one of the largest in the world. the threat that those might weapon -- those weapons might fall into the hands of extremists groups is something that rates very, very high on the range -- on the spectrum of threat scenarios that a number of governments are dealing with. and i think i will probably just leave it at that and not touch on the question of is ralph and how that relationship might factor into things. >> says. can you get to the microphone?

>> they que very much -- thank you very much. my question follows on some of the comments of the gentleman u.s. the question and the speakers addressed. how much does a russia's relationship with israel figure into its calculations and in factions vis-a-vis syria. >> that's a good question. >> thank you. that is actually very, very good question. certainly since the rise russia's relations have grown quite close. you know, there is economic relationships that have increased significantly. russians are now buying certain aspects of the israeli military technology.

israeli technology enhances russian arms sales to significant purchasers such as india. there are also huge russian-speaking days bora in israel. it's really quite curious because a lot of these people left russia because the did not like other were being treated in russia. they get to israel and they suddenly fallen love with russia. it's really remarkable. they become sort of a lobbying group for russians relations and also just on a human level the number of russian tourists. i believe in certain months the number of russian tourists have exceeded the number of american tourists. there is a huge, not just government to government, but society to society level contact amanda think that that is certainly -- i was at a russian israeli conference four years ago in jerusalem. what really ever amazed me was

israeli conservatives and russian officials think very much alike, especially about the negative view of the forces at work in the muslim and arab world. and i think that part of what has helped the russians sort of hang tough on the sod -- assad is while the russians recognize that they have very little influence in washington, they know that israel does and that israel is ambivalent about a change in syria. unfortunately israeli conservative government is not focusing on how things might be better with assad gone. focuses on how things might be worse. and so i think that what the russians see is that whenever moscow does that the israeli government will, in fact, an act to sort of restraint the american enthusiasm with regards

to what might happen in syria. whether that is right or wrong and certainly israel is a complex to entry. there has been a debate of what should happen in syria, but i think that on the whole, you know, that the israelis seem to prefer the devil they know to the one that they don't. thank you. >> well, one of the things to do, i call it almost the change in terms of foreign policy. i think we are going back now to the kind of diplomacy that we had an 19th century as opposed to the 20th-century when we had good guys, bad guys. everything was clear. but steady 19th century diplomacy cannot know how difficult it is. it used to change almost every day. a certain fluidity, and that

think we're going to see more and more than in the diplomacy that is going to take place now, the role of russia is a good example of that. you know, the relationship between israel and turkey, between turkey and the united states is another example. if you recall, only a few months ago people were saying that turkey is joining, you know, the terrorist camp. one other republican candidates even call the terrorist state. you know, the relationship with israel and so on. now turkey is, again to my emerging as an ally of the yes, states and so on. now, as far as this issue is concerned, it is much more complicated. i think the israelis actually want assad to fold because he is allied with hezbollah and peron. and in the middle east, the positive elements. so i don't think. of course everyone is worried what will happen after, but i think they do want him to hold.

at the same time, the relationship between israel and russia as you pointed out. has to do also with the role of turkey. talk about an alliance between supposedly between greece, israel, and cyprus. russia against turkey. again, i won't turn that into, you know, like a major transformation of relationships, but that is a big part of the process. things are going to change. going to be a good relationship between israel and turkey, israel and russia, the u.s. so let's not go from one extreme to another. i don't see a russian israeli alliance. i think just an improving relationship between the two countries which i think is overall quite positive. >> i think that is the first time i heard the word around in the west two hours. that is -- that leads me to ask this question. how much does that countries

stand to lose from developments in syria? the flow of the regime, the emergence of some different kind of regime. is russia acting in part to protect the iranian interest? >> that is a great question. you know, i think that the iranians to stand to lose an awful lot. aside is really there most important ally in the arab world. in many respects to the you know, this is not so much of russian verses american game. the saudi verses irani in one. and i think that, you know, the iranians, when the arab spring began they came out being cheerleaders for it. they -- the downfall of pro-western regimes in tunisia and egypt they predicted that

this was going to benefit a run tremendously and that, of course, has not quite come to fruition. not quite so happy when it is their ally that is under effect, but i think that syria has been the conflict through which a lot of iranian assistance through hezbollah has done. distance itself from the syrian government. i think iran stands to lose a lot of its leverage in the israeli-palestinian syrian and lebanese airiness if there is change. so, now, you know, in terms of the russian iranian relationship, i think that for russia they see themselves, good relations with what we think of as adversaries. israeli on the one hand, jen venture -- syria on the weather.

from the russian point of view it is a common thread. all of these are opposed to radical sunni islam and therefore they don't want to see any of these fall. why don't the americans recognize that? so that's that. >> just to add a word to, i tend to agree, mark, with your overall assessment. i think that the balance sheet or the audit of the impact on a runs position in the region in the event of a regime change needs to include some additional considerations. perhaps the most important one is whether, in fact, the success of the revolution would mean the end of resistance in terms of how serious new leaders would define their relationship to a number of core regional issues

in an entirely sure we should expect the success of the revolution would mean the end of resistance. questions like palestine, we have a very deeply nationalistic profile among the leaders of the opposition with respect to the overall orientation toward a number of regimes, the idea that any self respecting president of a post assad syrian state would embrace dependent on saudi arabia strikes me as profoundly unlikely and, perhaps, politically unwise. the idea that a new syrian government would completely reorient its foreign-policy posture in ways that would align it more closely with the u.s., i think, is also possible but unlikely. and so i think that even though a change of regime would certainly have a significant effect on hezbollah and the iranian ability to project of silence in the region, this notion of a broader strategic

tipping on the part of syria, i think, has often been overstated with respect to iranian and russian support of the assad regime, it is certainly the case that they're elements of collaboration. when we think about the moment at which it might prove to be in russia's interests to bring the of assad regime to the table, the presence of a run in syria and the role in equipping the armed forces with weapons, with ammunition, with supplies, the extent to which they stand to lose agree to more from a loss of that alliance that the russians would from a potential change of regime seems to me that we could see increasing tensions between iran and russia over how to bring about -- over how to manage the end game in syria than might be immediately apparent.

>> you have a question. you first. >> the question that i oppose it is open to anybody to answer. is there any concern regarding the fact that saudi arabia is implemented and hiring foreign mercenaries in providing arms traffickers and the last couple of months? mind you, i ask this question in the context of reports of the last ten years have implicated members of the saudi royal family involved in harboring two of the september 11th hijackers that attack this nation in 2001. >> there is misunderstanding mainly on the media about the armed opposition. the main portion of the opposition, soldiers who are

defected refuse to obey orders of the assad regime led by the officers. the faction of the armed opposition mainly under the name was called the revolutionary council's or the military councils. we have, in each city, in each town what is called a military council. the military council. the head of each military council, it is basically a colonial general who defected. and this is why the armed opposition in syria or what is called the free syrian army in much more organized way than the rebels we have and libya, and that sponsor many reports within even -- the cia confirmed. and, of course, many reports of the think tanks here in washington community. and, of course, the free syrian army much more organized. this is why we saw that without

any support from the international community, taking advantage, became much more. because they know exactly the weakness of the asset -- assad militia. the same army. and this is why this same accusations the group's, it is not mainly true. may leave those army officers defected. as today example i have a conference call with some of them. they explain to me this situation in damascus. i don't contact civilians. of the army officers who defected. they know the situation. they plan a lack of munitions they have. but basically because there is no safety zone it is very

difficult for those to be appeared in the media were to get much more public attention. and to response to your question , basically let's say 90 percent of the guns and arms coming from the assad regime itself, the assad army, we know that is very corrupt institution this is why it is very easy to get any -- to get any soldiers or officers and basically the source of their regime, it is located in different areas. the main location, the main location is in homes. when the free syrian army succeeds to take over many stores of the free syrian army they got many sources of arms.

.. in their interest and two armed radical jihadi speed in

fact they are engaged in a very protracted war against al qaeda inside saudi arabia. >> all of the panelists have dealt with a fine point on it right now that the u.s. is reassessing its foreign policy following the veto in the united nations security council last week what would be the one or two steps that the united states could take immediately or very soon from a diplomatic perspective and practical perspective and an effort to try to reach u.s. goals and improve the situation on the ground? >> they are there for the next meeting of the larocco and they should work closely with the league with turkey and other

countries to have a very definite recommendations about implementing safety. in turkey they are willing to do that and now today the jordanian prime minister didn't reveal and also mentioned some of that it's not clear, but he shows how they've demonstrated a lack of options from the international community to help jordan and lebanon the must accept if countries and the regime also very important signals coming not only from jordan and also from lebanon with the ministry to ask for the security council about the serious violation of the borders, the syrian when on borders and we see the regional

countries to call for more actions. before that there wasn't such strength. now they see that this is the situation. they should build on who that consensus on turkey to have the agenda to implement the safety zone. the zone inside this is a priority for the syrians right now. no one is calling for asking for troops or boots on the ground. no one is asking for the military intervention like the same way we have in iran. i think the army is much more better way to do that job but they needed the help and assistance. >> if i could add one more element on july 6, secretary clinton added some unscripted

comments to her speech in which she was very assertive in stating that russia and china are paying no price to their support for the regime, and she called on all of the governments represented at the meeting to take additional steps to make clear that there would be consequences for russia and china if they continue along their current path. it seems to me one of the most significant consequences could be and i think is likely to be the shift of international diplomacy a round of the question out of the u.n. security council and the increasing marginalization of russia as an actor in international diplomatic efforts. i'm not talking about the presence on the ground. and if we in fact find that this pace of change on the ground continues to accelerate and that

we are sooner rather than later dealing with the end stages of the regime, the possibility that russia could be excluded from that process i think what be a possibility that the leadership would view with a great deal of concern. so why would you that as an additional step of accelerating the shift to international diplomacy into the arena as where russia no longer exercise is the veto over the international community's strategy towards syria. >> i would certainly just maybe elaborate on what steve proposes, and that is i think what may be the u.s. should do is at this point announced that it will no longer seek to resolve the situation and syria through the security council but it will only do so through the friends of syria and leave the

door open for russia to join that group. i also think that sort of privately what we ought to do is not just the u.s. but the arab league, the syrian national council which by the way they do talk to that we really need to engage in what are you doing? it's one thing to enjoy the united states but up until the arab spring he had been successful in courting public opinion. he had been very good at this and suddenly it all stopped and i think there's the case he made with regard to libya that part of the reason why the russians approved, not approved but allowed to pass the security council resolution on libya was because this was requested by the arab league and was sensitive to the opinion that this is simply ended that they

seem to not care anymore about what the arabs think and this is shocking that in many respects russian policy has become very bloody minded with regard to syria, and i think some of us that actually do care about russia this is something we ought to talk about privately but on the other hand go forward with our policies through the friends of syria. >> okay. >> thank you very much for the presentation. my question is about the opposition. it seems that you just want to tell the media what is going on in the evolution the question is like we know that the parties are uprising in the middle east during come before and the arab

spring. what we do but the question and how much we are engaged in the transformation that the islamic parties are going through? what happened for example? nobody expected it to rise because the use political islam as a means. look at the brotherhood position they changed. so it isn't a static issue and they are changing every day. the question is what do we do about it in terms of the policy? >> i think this is a very important question because if we compare the parliamentary election with the muslim brothers in egypt, they get the majority and compare the results we have after the election members the became president between this five months they lost 5 million votes within five

months only and this is why it is neck by a neck i think if we have other candidates who has been seen as the son of the devotee establishment and of the mubarak regime, i don't think that he will win. this is why i think it's the dynamic within the society is changing every time and it is quite difficult to see they are in the 70's and 80's tell the same right now. if they do understand that this change and most of them speak and build the coalitions with other local parties. if they believe that they can take over maybe they don't care, but they believe they look into nisha they have the coalition

and in egypt right now they are building the coalition. as a coalition of different secular groups, liberal groups and others come and they are not the majority. but of course they are the most organized groups and this is -- data and give some that vantage is in the future. but anyway, i think they should take this in consideration and they should engage with the islamists and they shouldn't engage with other groups and i don't think that the obama administration has at least a plan for the arab spring or prepare for that. it's been awful the crisis here and the lack of sources within. then you have of course a democracy administration which

they don't have after the war in iraq and afghanistan they showed no interest for them to have a strong foreign policy in the middle east manly the obama administration in its campaign within the election and in afghanistan and iraq this is why they show no interest to do more in the middle east and this has weakened the administration and the u.s. position in the region other than we don't see the officials in the region libya or to nisha or see any major role in the region. >> is that the response? okay. i do have a question from the

audience. >> it is a dynamic situation and it changes from day to day and so should the u.s. policy. the u.s. policy is to adopt in the reality. now i totally disagree this motion that the u.s. has the will to micromanage our politics which again reflect tribal, ethnic, religious, sectarian politics are much more complex than the elections in brooklyn and new york and affect the outcome they don't have the ability to do that. i think that the obama administration followed by what is basically a very reasonable policy that there was a change in egypt they couldn't prevent mubarak from falling. they decided that they just have to try to adjust and they don't

have any other choice but to support the power of an islamist which now use of the secular and liberal parties are now accusing the american administration of being alive in the muslim brotherhood but they didn't have any other choice other than that and they should be careful when it comes in terms of getting involved too much in the domestic politics. the end result is you decide based on policies that are going to be the policies of the e egyptian government to what extent they allow the interest and the values of the united states. if they don't come in you oppose them. >> this question is from the live stream audience. the option of the state feasible and is this option being discussed? i suppose this grows out of the

concern that there would be retribution against the highlights. one of the biggest mistakes we made was purging the sunni baptists. how much -- how likely is it that significant segments of the alawite dominated regime are going to act against al asad, and how much of the alawite regime has to go? >> because they are implicated in this repression, and how much of the alawite regime would be acceptable? >> i think regarding there is much attention in the media about the last option would be the alawite state, which i don't think that this should be an

option at all. there is no even within that community discussion or debate about that. and there is no such theory working on or looking for this option because even that in the coastal part in syria there were mixed people. much of the heart of the cities in the attack and they have demonstrations every day. the support of course they are mixed up. there is no pure alawite region where they have their own states. but fortunately that is much more -- we speak in the media on this option. we have much more debate on that. regarding the second, i think now the opposition in syria took the citizens in iran very seriously and other countries

very seriously. yet this is why when the two weeks ago one of the top leaders and the baathist party, the syrian ambassador in iraq he automatically welcomed within the syrian opposition, and this is why there is -- we know that the party became power it is a socialist party and it became everyone joined to take some benefits within the states rather than the of a logical operated party as that before in the 50's. this is why when of course you will not punish 1 million members in the party because they are members in the baathist party. and now since the uprising

started, the first wave was the baathist party members in other areas and. now we have at least the two top leaders within who are the head of the regional office and now they are in turkey. we are working in opposition with them and side by side. when we call that, we need that regime mainly we mean the family eddy of their top advisers and officers within the security. one case three days ago the head of the military security was deflected, he was responsible in

june, 2011 with more than 76,000 killed because he was head of the military security at that time and now it is a debate with you can do with him. you accept him because there is no blood on his hand, and this is why it is not an easy issue but within this, very detailed in the different types of transition in justice and this is i think implemented in the future. >> thank you. it's almost noon, so we showed -- i should say thank you for coming. in my introductory remarks i neglected to say that we have a web site, www.mepc.org to read articles from previous issues of

the journal are there. the previous capitol hill conferences are there and i invite you to visit that and see everything we have to offer and thank you again for coming. [applause] and think you to the panelists. [applause]

the co-chairs of the latino leadership house task force say it's in the u.s. economic security interests to place greater focus and forge more partnerships with latin american countries. the willson center's mexico

institute and pacific council on international policy held a panel discussion focusing on how to change the u.s. policy to address the region's growth. this is 90 minutes. >> get more and welcome to the woodrow wilson center. it's a pleasure to be with you this morning. thanks for coming. we are very pleased to be cosponsoring and hosting this meeting today of a task force on latino leadership task force, latinos and foreign policy which is largely been organized by the pacific council on international policy and from the specific counselor with us today as well as antonio hernandez who i will introduce a moment who are the speakers today. we are very pleased to be working to get rid of the pacific council which is the leading voice on foreign policy issues, on the southern california and outstanding institutions and on behalf of the woodrow wilson center, very

happy to be working at the pacific council. very lucky to have with us to extraordinary leaders. i will give you -- you have the biographies here for both of them but let me say briefly that he has been a leading businessman, has been the head of what is the u.s. west ceo and the head of telecom companies in europe in the pacific and asia as well as in the united states as a distinguished career in business, a leader in the republican party as well as on the bipartisan and initiatives across the aisle between republican democrats and antonio hernandez needs dillinger election, the longtime leader and today the president of the california community foundation and former counsel to the senate judiciary committee and has served in all sorts of roles on politics, on issues of immigration reform, issues of almost every major domestic

policy and foreign policy issue you can imagine that has faced the united states through a distinguished career. they will tell you about the latino leadership project and the task force on the foreign policy in a moment. they are the two co-chairs of this initiative, and which we think is a new edition and a powerful addition to the discussion on u.s. relations with the western hemisphere and a powerful addition to the discussions on latinos and a variety of policy issues. let me go ahead and turn it over to -- is there a call? i think we have a call coming in someone can check on that date we also like to welcome the audience from c-span and anyone else watching us on the live stream from the wilson center web site as well. let me turn it over to antonia. >> we are happy to share with you a new initiative sponsored

by the pacific council on economic policy, an organization out of los angeles devoted to the study of foreign relations issues from the west coast perspective with an emphasis on the western hemisphere and the east. about a year ago we started the discussion of a creation of a task force that would look specifically at the foreign relations, foreign affairs from a latino perspective. the question is what is the latino perspective and why a little perspective? first, as you know, the latino community in the united states has grown rapidly, and because of an affinity culture managed to some degree ties. there is a shared experience and an understanding of the americas

and this task force will look at that relationship in a very important point in time in america's history. the evolution and growth of the community, the importance of what has been happening south of the border economically and politically in the last 15 years as you know economic growth in latin america, south america and mexico has outpaced the united states. in the united states the community is now a major demographic factor and so we want to give a look at how latinos look at foreign affairs and more importantly one value at the value-added debate in the discussion and now i will turn it over to my colleague. >> thank you, antonio. just to emphasize this notion

that says the latino perspective is critical, and we think that obviously given the perspective of where there's been so much migration and so much transnational traffic of people that have come back-and-forth is critical. my experience has been about running large companies around the world. and as i think about our country, the united states, and think about, you know, what are the drivers of success and what is a story here that is really important to every american, it is about our trade and it is about our trade and economic flows between us, the united states and across the americas. just to give you a few quick point and i think but triet added that exports. madigan of exports i think about jobs created in the u.s.. and jobs that and why people

here in the u.s.. and when we think about an exciting story, i think most of us have a picture if you pick up almost any magazine come any newspaper, you watch the electronic medium you will see a story today about china. you will see a story today about india. one of the interesting data points i think all of us should keep in the back of our mind maybe now in the front of our mind. if you look at trade we export more to mexico than we do to china. we export three times the amount of goods and services to latin america as we do to china so the point isn't that china is important. the point is that mexico, latin america, the countries to the south we have dramatic and substantial trade flows between the countries.

we also then translated them into it means jobs in the u.s.. and we also translated it into the fact that as we think about our economy, and as we think about stories for us to focus on, clearly leader is critical. labor tall sectors of our economy. we can talk about ph these but we can also talk about certain other skilled categories, and we can talk about on skilled workers, because this economy requires all kinds of workers at all layers of our economy. so, when we think about the flow, flow of human capital in addition to financial capital, that is part of the story. so, when the pacific council decided to look at this and particularly the committee started to look at this, we started thinking about it with that latino lens and thinking

about how it benefits, which strengthens and how important it is to our country. to last comments. one is as we think about even within our borders of the united states, the latino economy, meaning the hispanic gdp equivalent spent today is worth about $1.2 trillion. now again, to translate it, the comparable might be when we talk about indian and china and brazil and russia. [inaudible] sorry, i'm going to turn that off. >> we might think about comparable and we have a country within our country. when we think about the hispanic sector of our economy. so we have many small medium